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with cut timber.3 This principle could be easily adapted to the
real property area by treating the appreciation in value of the
property while held as an investment as capital gain, and the
profits made in developing and selling as ordinary income.8
Such a scheme would surely restore equity and certainty in this
much-litigated area.
Leon J. Reymond, Jr.

"OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROVISIONS

Plaintiff and Courville were guest passengers in a vehicle
when it collided with an uninsured automobile. The uninsured
motorist's negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The
host's insurer deposited $10,000.00, the policy limit, of which
Courville1 was awarded $5,000.00, the host $2,000.00, and plaintiff $3,000.00. Each claimant would have been entitled to a larger
recovery but for the size of the policy limit. Plaintiff then
brought suit against his own insurer, under his policy's uninsured motorist provisions. Defendant insurer argued that under
the "other insurance" clause in plaintiff's policy 2 its liability
was extinguished by the host's insurer's payment of $3,000.00,
since the uninsured motorist limits of both plaintiff's and the
host's policies were identical. The district court allowed plaintiff
full recovery ($5,000.00) under his policy. Held, amended and
37. The Internal Revenue Code treats the application in value of the

standing timber as capital gain to be considered realized when the timber
is cut, and the profits made in selling the cut timber as ordinary income.
Id.§ 631(a).
38. SURREY & WARREN, FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION, CASES AND MATERIALS
695 (1960); Dakin, The Capital Gains Treasure Chest: Rational Extension or

Expedient Di8tortionf, 14 LA. L. REv. 505, 522 (1954). A similar effect could
be created by the taxpayer by the establishment of another entity to acquire
the property for development if he already holds the land for investment
purposes. Berge, Special Tax Problems of Participants in

Real Estate

Developments, 45 TAXES 161, 163 (1967).
1. Courville was denied recovery under his own policy's uninsured
motorist coverage in the companion case of Courville v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 797 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), writs refused, 197 So.2d
79 (1967).
2. The clause contained the following language: "Other Insurance. With
respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile now
(sic) owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall
apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available
to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance,
and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit
of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance." LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791, 792 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967).
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affirmed. Plaintiff can recover only $2,000.00 from his insurer.
LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
The general types of "other insurance" clauses and their
interaction have been treated elsewhere. 8 The "other insurance"
clause in question here is a variation of the "excess" typeif there is other insurance available to the insured, the insurer
will be liable only for the amount by which the insured's limit
of liability for uninsured motorist coverage exceeds the pertinent
limits of liability of all other applicable insurance.
This case of first impression to Louisiana courts presents
two basic issues-does the "other insurance" clause in the uninsured motorist provisions of plaintiff's policy contravene La.
R.S. 22:1406(D),4 which provides for mandatory uninsured
motorist coverage of $5,000.00/$10,000.00 in every automobile
liability policy unless the insured rejects it, and if it does not,
what effect is to be given to this clause? The court noted that
both La. R.S. 22:620(A) 5 and the 1960 amendment to La. R.S.
22:1406(D) gave the Insurance Commissioner the duty of
approving provisions of automobile liability policies. Interpreting these statutes, the court cited Roberts v. City of Baton
Rouge and Bacon v. Reed.7 In Roberts it was held that only
where the construction or application of a statute is doubtful
should great weight in judicial interpretation be given to the
administrator's interpretation. Bacon held that where a statute
3. See Note, 27 LA. L. Rv.114, 115 (1966). It is pointed out that " 'other
insurance' clauses are of three principal types: pro rata clauses under which
if there is other insurance the issuer will be liable only for the proportion
of the loss that represents the ratio between his limit of liability and the
total limit of liability of all insurance covering the loss; excess clauses,
under which if there is other insurance the issuer will be liable only for
the amount of loss that exceeds the limits of the other policy; and
escape clauses under which if there is other insurance the insurer is not
liable at all."
4. LA. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (1950) provides: "No automobile liability insurance . . . shall be delivered . . . unless coverage

is provided . . . in

not

less than the limits described in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Law of Louisiana, under provisions filed with and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of
uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease,
including death, resulting therefrom; provided, however, that the coverage
required under this section shall not be applicable where any insured named
in the policy shall reject the coverage."
5. LA. R.S. 22:620(A) (1950) provides: "No basic insurance policy form
. . . shall be issued, delivered, or used unless it has been filed with and
approved by the Commissioner of Insurance."
6. 236 La. 521, 108 So.2d 111 (1958).
7. 130 So.2d 141 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961).
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is subject to two interpretations, the view of the administrators,
if reasonable and equitable, should be accepted by the courts.
The majority in the instant case felt that the meaning of R.S.
22:1406(D) was obscure, and that the interpretation by the
Casualty and Surety Division was reasonable and equitable. 8
However, the result reached in the instant case went beyond
this interpretation of R.S. 22:1406 (D) by the Casualty and Surety
Division.
The purpose of R.S. 22:1406(D), said the court, is to give
the same protection to the injured insured as he would have
had if the uninsured motorist had been covered by a standard
liability policy. 9 This purpose is consistent with the opinions
cited as authority. It is submitted, however, that this stated
purpose of R.S. 22:1406(D) and the decisions cited for authority
are in conflict with the result reached in the principal case. 10
8. H. P. Walker, stipulated by both parties to be the spokesman for the
Insurance Commissioner, was asked whether an insured could collect under
his $5,000.00J$10,000.00 uninsured motorist provisions if he had already
recovered $5,000.00 from his host's $5,000.00/$10,000.00 uninsured motorist
provisions. Walker stated that the insured could collect nothing from his
own uninsured motorist provisions, since these provisions were not intended
to apply as excess coverage under such circumstances. It should be noted,
however, that this hypothetical factual situation can be distinguished
from that of the instant case in that LeBlanc was one of three insureds
under the provisions of the host's policy and recovered only $3,000.00;
not $5,000.00 as the insured in the situation envisioned by Walker. Walker
did not, therefore, state whether or not an insured's policy would apply as
excess in the factual situation of the instant case.
9. 194 So.2d 791, 796, citing CoucH, INSURANCE § 45:623, at 570 (2d ed.
1964). The dissent in the instant case disagreed with the legislative purpose
of uninsured motorist protection as set out by the majority. The dissent
interpreted this statute in its most literal terms every automobile
liability policy in Louisiana must contain uninsured motorist provisions of
$5,000.00/$10,000.00. Since the Louisiana statutes nowhere specifically gave
the insurer the right to limit its liability below this, the dissent would
require that an insured be covered to the full extent of his own policy
limits, regardless of the number of policies under which he is covered.
The dissent pointed out that a Florida statute was almost identical to
R.S. 22:1406. A Florida case factually similar to the instant case held that
this statute invalidated such "other insurance" clauses in uninsured motorist
provisions. Sellers v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla.
1966). Hence, in Florida an uninsured recovers to the full limits of his
own policy, regardless of the number of other policies under which he is an
insured unless, of course, the amount of total injuries Is less than the
sum of all the policies. The dissent's position of awarding plaintiff $5,000.00
under his own policy would, therefore, be in accord with the result reached
in Florida.
10. All of the cases cited by the court for authority were concerned
with "other insurance" clauses similar to that in the Instant case. In each
case the plaintiff's and the host's policies contained the same liability limits.
In none of these cases was the plaintiff allowed any recovery under his own
policy. This difference in result may be justified, however, since in none of
these cases did the stated facts clearly indicate that the factual situation
was similar to that in this case, i.e., that the plaintiff had to share the
coverage of the host's policy with one or more other parties. Kirby v. Ohio
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The host's policy contained $5,000.00/$10,000.00 uninsured motorist limits, which guaranteed plaintiff the same protection he
would have had if the uninsured motorist had standard liability
coverage." But by awarding plaintiff $2,000.00 from Alstate,
his own insurer, the court allowed plaintiff more protection than
he would have had if injured by a motorist with standard
coverage.
Although the court assigned no reasons for awarding the
plaintiff $2,000.00, it may have reasoned that, as the only person
covered by his own policy, plaintiff would be protected to the
extent of $5,000.00; whereas as one of three persons covered by
the host's policy, the limit of liability of the host's insurer to
plaintiff was only $3,000.00. Therefore, the court apparently
concluded, that plaintiff's policy should be treated as providing
excess insurance of $2,000.00 under the facts of this case. Under
this approach the terms "limit of liability for this coverage"
and "applicable limit of liability of such other coverage" in the
standard "other insurance" clause, would not mean the theoretical maximum limits of the coverage ($5,000.00/$10,000.00)
but rather the actual amount of coverage available to the insured
from each policy under a particular factual situation. It is
submitted that this interpretation of the "other insurance" clause
is reasonable and would not conflict with the opinion of the
Casualty and Surety Division, because under that factual situation the coverage available to the insured under both policies
was $5,000.00.
While the reasons for the court's decision are not clear, its
effect seems evident. An insured with an "other insurance"
clause in a $5,000.00/$10,000.00 policy, when injured as a guest
passenger (in a vehicle with $5,000.001$10,000.00 uninsured
motorist coverage) by the fault of an uninsured motorist, and
who has recovered less than $5,000.00 from the host's insurer,
can recover under his uninsured motorist provisions an amount
equal to the difference between $5,000.00 and the amount reCas. Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1965); Grunfeld v.
Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1965); Burcham
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963); Miller v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 66 Wash.2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965).
11. La. R.S. 32.900(B) (1950) provides: "Such owner's policy of liability
insurance shall insure the person named therein ... as follows: five thousand
dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person In any one
accident and, subject to said limit for one person, ten thousand dollars
because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident."
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ceived from the host's insurer.12 The insured can recover, therefore, a maximum of $5,000.00, regardless of the number of
policies under which he is covered. It is not clear from the
decision in the instant case, however, whether the court, by
awarding plaintiff $2,000.00, was invalidating the standard "other
insurance" clause approved by the Commissioner of Insurance,
or whether it was merely interpreting the terms "limit of
liability" and "applicable limits of liability" in the "other insurance" clause as meaning the actual amount of recovery available to the insured from each policy under the particular facts
of each case. It is submitted that a clarification of the meaning
and legal status of such clauses, under the factual situation of
the instant case, is in order by both the courts and the Insurance
Commissioner.
Shelby H. Moore, Jr.

PROPERTY LAw--CoNTIxuous SERvITuDE--AcT OF MAN

TEST AND PossE SIoN OF TEN YEARS
Plaintiff pumped irrigation water into his rice field, and
at harvest time opened a gap to release it through a ditch
across defendant's estate. He had been doing this two out of
every four years for thirty years. Held: Irrigation drainage is
a continuous-apparent servitude which may be acquired by
possession of ten years. The flow of water or the exercise of
the servitude is continuous even though acts of man on the
dominant estate are necessary to replenish the supply, or to
reset the state of affairs necessary for the exercise of the servitude. A servitude is continuous as long as the servitude's use
survives an act of man performed outside the servient estate.
Wild v. LeBlanc, 191 So.2d 146 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
Since continuity and possession' are critical requirements
for acquisitive prescription of servitudes, the meaning of these
12. Of course the insured can only recover under his own policy as
far as ,its total limits go. For example, if more than one person qualifies
as an insured under his policy, the court might distribute the limits of
plaintiff's policy between the other insured[s] or give plaintiff less than
the difference between $5,000.00 and what he recovered from the primary

insurer.
1. "Continuous and apparent servitudes may be acquired by title, or by
" LA. CIviL CODE art. 765 (1870).
a possession of ten years ..
"Continuous nonapparent servitudes, and discontinuous servitudes,
whether apparent or not, can be established only by a title ...

."

Id. art. 766.

